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Understanding Collusive Practices in Chinese Construction Projects 1 
Ming Shan1, Albert P.C. Chan2,Yun Le3, Yi Hu4*, and Bo Xia5 2 
Abstract 3 
Collusion is of critical concern to the construction sector as it undermines free competition in 4 
the construction market. Given that previous research on collusive practices concentrates 5 
mainly on bidding phase, this study extended the research focus to the entire construction 6 
period and aimed to investigate specific collusive practices in Chinese construction projects. A 7 
total of 22 specific collusive practices in Chinese construction projects were first identified 8 
based on a comprehensive literature review and a Delphi survey with 15 industry experts. Then 9 
a questionnaire survey was conducted to prioritize the identified collusive practices in terms of 10 
their probability and severity. The survey results indicate that the primary collusive practices 11 
in Chinese construction projects are misrepresentation of qualification certificates, loose site 12 
supervision, misusing prequalification requirements, fake tendering, approval of the 13 
unnecessary change orders, collective collusive tendering by helping one another, the 14 
nomination of a particular supplier, issuing certified works falsely, and inflating tender price. 15 
The findings of the study not only provide a clearer picture of collusive practices in 16 
construction projects in China but also provide better understandings of collusive practices in 17 
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other emerging economies. 18 
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Introduction 21 
Collusion is a set of behaviors where competitors coordinate their market behavior 22 
surreptitiously, which is contrary to the principles of free competition (Chotibhongs and Arditi 23 
2012a; b; Zarkada-Fraser 2000). Collusion is also insidious and harmful to the management of 24 
construction projects because it may decrease the number of bidders and increase contract 25 
prices, thus resulting in a poor project outcome (Oladinrin and Ho 2014; Zarkada-Fraser and 26 
Skitmore 2000). Moreover, collusion has brought a ‘dirty’ image to the construction sector and 27 
degraded public trust on the sector (Zarkada-Fraser 2000).  28 
Identifying collusive practices is critical because it is an initial but fundamental step of 29 
collusion research, which would benefit the establishment of anti-collusion measures. Several 30 
researchers have scrutinized collusive practices in the construction sectors of diverse countries, 31 
such as Australia (Ray et al. 1999; Vee and Skitmore 2003; Zarkada-Fraser and Skitmore 2000), 32 
India (Tabish and Jha 2011), The Netherlands (Dorée 2004; Priemus 2004), Nigeria (Alutu 33 
2007; Alutu and Udhawuve 2009), South Africa (Bowen et al. 2012; 2007a; b), and Zambia 34 
(Sichombo et al. 2009). However, little research input in the construction sector of China, 35 
which contributes significantly to the global construction market.  36 
Since the establishment of the socialist market economy in 1992, China has been 37 
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continuously uplifting its construction sector by reforming administrative systems, 38 
reorganizing industry structure, and promoting free competition (Mayo and Liu 1995). 39 
However, collusion is a stubborn problem concerning the Chinese construction sector (Le and 40 
Shan 2013; Zou 2006). According to the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention of China 41 
(2011), the number of commercial bribery cases in the construction sector between 2007 and 42 
2009 was 13,006, accounting for nearly 44% of all business bribery cases (29,600) occurred in 43 
that period. It has been widely accepted that a collusive agreement is a fundamental element in 44 
any commercial bribery case in China (Le et al. 2014). This could be attributed to the following 45 
facts. First, the key players of the Chinese construction market are the major state-owned 46 
construction companies (National Bureau of Statistics 2014), which are more likely to involve 47 
collusion practices due to the principal-agent problem (Le and Shan 2013). Second, current 48 
Chinese construction laws merely target collusive practices in the bidding stage, ignoring those 49 
prevail in other construction stages (Lam and Chen 2004). Given these unique features, there 50 
is an urgent need to investigate collusive practices in the Chinese construction projects. 51 
Furthermore, the current literature investigating collusive practices have mainly 52 
concentrated on project bidding phase (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2013; Lo et al. 1999; Ray et al. 53 
1999; Sohail and Cavill 2008; Vee and Skitmore 2003; Zarkada-Fraser and Skitmore 2000). 54 
However, collusive practices can also occur in other project phases, such as conception phase 55 
and implementation phase (Bowen et al. 2007a; b). Therefore, this study attempts to broaden 56 
the research boundary by identifying and evaluating specific collusive practices in the entire 57 
construction period. 58 
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Literature Review 59 
To identify collusive practices in construction projects, a systematic literature search was 60 
conducted to spot the collusion-related papers published in peer-reviewed construction 61 
engineering and management (CEM) journals in the past two decades (1995-2014). It followed 62 
the structured search method, advocated by Hu et al. (2015) and Yi and Chan (2014), which 63 
consists of the following two steps. 64 
Step 1, ten peer-reviewed CEM journals, comprising Journal of Construction Engineering 65 
and Management, Construction Management and Economics, Journal of Management in 66 
Engineering, International Journal of Project Management, Project Management Journal, 67 
Building and Environment, Automation in Construction, Building Research and Information, 68 
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, and Journal of Professional Issues 69 
in Engineering Education and Practice, were first selected as target journals. Considering that 70 
collusive practice is a type of unethical corrupt behavior (Le et al. 2014), a combined code of 71 
“Collusion OR Collusive OR Ethics OR Ethical OR Corruption” was searched in the 72 
Title/Abstract/Keyword field in the database of these ten target journals between 1995 and 73 
2014. 74 
Step 2, in order to gather more collusion-related papers, a new search was carried out 75 
using two popular search engines, namely the Web of Science and Scopus. The combined code 76 
of “Collusion OR Collusive OR Ethics OR Ethical OR Corruption AND Construction” was 77 
searched in the Title/Abstract/Keyword field of Scopus, and in the Topic field of Web of 78 
Science respectively, within the period from 1995 to 2014. 79 
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Subsequently, a visual examination was further conducted on the initial papers to verify 80 
its relevance to the topic of this study. Only those examine the collusive practices were retained. 81 
Finally, a total of 20 papers were retained via this systematic search process. Table 1 lists the 82 
20 identified papers, as well as their original countries.  83 
Table	1	Collusive	practice	papers	identified	from	literature	review	84 
No. Reference Construction period involved Country/Region 
1. Lo et al. (1999) Bidding & tendering Taiwan 
2. Ray et al. (1999) Bidding & tendering Australia 
3. Zarkada-Fraser and Skitmore 
(2000)  
Bidding & tendering Australia 
4. Vee and Skitmore (2003) Bidding & tendering Australia 
5. Dorée (2004) Bidding & tendering The Netherlands 
6. Priemus (2004) Bidding & tendering The Netherlands 
7. Zou (2006) Bidding & tendering, construction China 
8. Alutu (2007) Bidding & tendering Nigeria 
9. Bowen et al. (2007a) Design, bidding & tendering, construction South Africa 
10. Bowen et al. (2007b) Design, bidding & tendering, construction South Africa 
11. Sohail and Cavill (2008) Planning, design, bidding & tendering, 
construction 
Not indicated 
12. Alutu and Udhawuve (2009) Bidding & tendering Nigeria 
13. Hartley (2009) Bidding & tendering Australia 
14. de Jong et al. (2009) Bidding & tendering Not indicated 
15. Sichombo (2009) Bidding & tendering Zambia 
16. Wang et al. (2009) Construction China 
17. Ameh and Odusami (2010) Bidding & tendering Nigeria 
18. Tabish and Jha (2011) Conception, bidding & tendering, 
construction 
India 
19. Bowen et al.(2012) Bidding & tendering South Africa 
20. Ballesteros-Pérez et al (2013) Bidding & tendering Spain 
The existing literature reveals that particular efforts have been made to investigate 85 
collusive practices in construction projects. For instance, Ray et al. (1999), Priemus (2004), 86 
and Ballesteros-Pérez (2013) regarded collusion as one of the major ethical issues in tendering 87 
because it enables unethical tenderers to reap an illicit profit. Zarkada-Fraser and Skitmore 88 
(2000) conducted a survey in the Australian construction industry and identified three collusive 89 
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practices committed by tenderers, i.e. submission of cover prices, withdrawal from the bidding 90 
process, and inflation of tenders by a pre-arranged amount. Vee and Skitmore (2003) 91 
investigated the collusive practices between clients and their preferred tenderers, including 92 
clients divulging more tender information to preferred tenderers and withholding vital 93 
information from the other tenderers, bias in tendering evaluations to favor major contractors, 94 
and clients pre-selecting consultant then calling tenders to fulfill organizational or statutory 95 
requirements.  96 
Bowen et al.(2007a) conducted a survey in the South African construction industry and 97 
found various forms of collusive tendering, including leaking of tender price in return for 98 
payment, cover pricing, bid cutting, hidden fees and commissions, compensation of tendering 99 
costs to unsuccessful tenderers. Sohail and Cavill (2008) revealed a typical collusive practice 100 
where project requirements may be overstated or tailored to fit the preferred tenderer. Tabish 101 
and Jha (2011) investigated collusive practices involved in the Indian public procurement, such 102 
as adequate and full publicity not given to tender, pre-qualification not done as per notified 103 
criteria, and evaluation of tenders not done correctly as per announcedrules. Alutu (2007) 104 
andAlutu and Udhawuve (2009) scrutinized the collusive practices in the Nigerian construction 105 
industry and found that the chief executive may award a contract to his/her preferred company 106 
illegally without a necessary procedure of tendering, that the use of incomplete and/or low-107 
quality materials by contractor are ignored by the supervising team due to the collusive 108 
agreement between the two parties, and that completion certificates are sometimes issued 109 
illegally to the contractor to enable collection of payments, even when jobs are incomplete or 110 
sometimes abandoned. Sichombo et al. (2009) also obtained similar findings in their research 111 
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on collusive practices in the Zambian construction industry. 112 
Collusive practices have also been dispersedly investigated in the contexts of Taiwan and 113 
mainland China. For instance, Lo et al.(1999) found that, in Taipei mass rapid transit projects, 114 
clients might set high prequalification requirements to restrain competition, and certain 115 
contractors may use the name of qualified contractors to bid and operate projects. Zou (2006) 116 
mentioned some collusive practices of contractors in his study of anti-corruption strategies in 117 
the Chinese construction sector. Wang et al. (2009) stated that, in Chinese construction projects, 118 
supervising engineers might collude with contractors or clients by concealing their illegal 119 
activities to government authorities. 120 
This brief review indicates that, although efforts have been made to investigate collusive 121 
practices in construction projects, research of this topic in the Chinese context remains limited. 122 
Meanwhile, studies of collusive practices are mainly focused on project bidding phase, 123 
ignoring project conception and implementation phases. Thus, this study attempted to fill this 124 
knowledge gap by conducting a systematic investigation of collusive practices in the Chinese 125 
construction projects. 126 
Research Methods 127 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods was employed to address the 128 
research question in this study. First, an initial list of collusive practices in construction projects 129 
was identified from a comprehensive literature review. Second, the initial collusive practices 130 
were refined by a two-round Delphi panel. Third, based on the consolidated framework, an 131 
empirical questionnaire survey was administered to gauge these refined collusive practices in 132 
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terms of probability and severity. The sequential use of qualitative and quantitative research 133 
method is expected to yield stronger and more reliable findings (Hon et al. 2013). 134 
Delphi Survey 135 
Based on a comprehensive literature review, an initial list of 22 collusive practices was 136 
established (see Table 2). To refine this initial list under the context of China, a two-round 137 
Delphi survey was conducted. 138 
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Table	2	Collusive	practices	identified	from	literature	review	139 
No. Collusive practice Definition 
CP1  Misusing prequalification requirements A client misuses prequalification requirements by setting up the tailored prequalification requirements to fit its 
preferred tenderer. 
CP2  Leaking vital information by the client A client leaks vital information (e.g. pricing by other tenderers) to its preferred tenderer. 
CP3  Inflating tender price A client hints tenderers to inflate tender price in return for kickbacks. 
CP4  Fake tendering A client pre-selects a contractor/consultant/supplier, and then calls tenderers to fulfill organizational or statutory 
requirements. 
CP5  Intervening in tender evaluation The chief executive in a client organization intervenes in tender evaluation and helps his/her preferred tenderer 
win the contract. 
CP6  Splitting a large project illegally To evade the due tender procedure, a client splits a large project which should be awarded by tendering into several 
small projects and awards them directly to his/her preferred tenderer. 
CP7  The lack of publicity A client gives insufficient or inadequate advertising of tender. 
CP8  Insufficient tender time A client sets an excessively short tender time for the potential tenderers. 
CP9  The absence of tender The chief executive in a client organization approves and awards a contract to his/her preferred tenderer directly 
but illegally without a necessary tender procedure. 
CP10 Bias in tender evaluation A tenderer bribes the member(s) of tender evaluation panel to seek for the illegal competitive advantages in tender 
evaluation. 
CP11 Misrepresentation of qualification 
certificates 
A qualified contractor facilitates an unqualified contractor to participate in tendering by providing its qualification 
certificate illegally. 
CP12 Collective collusive tendering by 
helping one another 
Collusive tenderers assist one of them in winning the contract according to an agreement that they help each other 
win the contract in turns. 
CP13 Helping the pre-established tenderer 
by giving up the contract 
A collusive agreement is reached that the tenderer providing the most competitive price helps the pre-established 
tenderer win the contract by giving up the contract. 
CP14 Leaking vital information by the 
bidding consultant 
A bidding consultant leaks vital tendering information to the particular tenderer who has paid bribery. 
CP15 Loose site supervision The irregularities conducted by a contractor in project construction are ignored by the site supervising team 
because of the collusive pact between the two parties. 
10 
No. Collusive practice Definition 
CP16 Issuing the certified works falsely A quantity surveyor falsely issues the certified works in order to obtain extra money from the contractor. 
CP17 Seeking for unnecessary change orders To get extra profits from construction changes, a contractor bribes the designer and asks for the unnecessary design 
change orders. 
CP18 Approval of the unnecessary change 
orders 
A contractor bribes the client staff for his/her active approval of the unnecessary change orders. 
CP19 The nomination of a particular supplier A supplier bribes the client staff to get it nominated as a supplier of the project and recommended to the contractor. 
CP20 The manipulated design for a 
particular supplier 
Based on a collusive pact between the designer and the supplier, project design is manipulated to benefit the latter. 
CP21 The usage of unqualified materials The unqualified construction materials are provided and used favorably according to the collusive agreement 
between the supplier and the contractor. 
CP22 Inflating material price The prices of the materials supplied are inflated due to the collusive agreement between the supplier and the client. 
140 
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The Delphi method is a structured communication and consensus building approach 141 
amongst a group of experts on a complex problem, which has been widely adopted in CEM 142 
research (e.g. Ameyaw et al. 2016; Hallowell and Gambatese 2009; Xia and Chan 2012a, b). 143 
The success of a Delphi survey depends primarily on the careful selection of panel members 144 
(Chan et al. 2001; Xia et al. 2009). Therefore, the following criteria were employed to identify 145 
eligible participants for this Delphi survey: (1) at least ten years of experience in the Chinese 146 
construction sector and (2) possessing management experience related to bidding and tendering 147 
ever before. In particular, the latter criterion was highlighted, considering that the majority of 148 
identified collusive practices are related to bidding and tendering affairs in construction 149 
projects. 150 
A total of 15 experts (as shown in Table 3) meeting the selection criteria were identified 151 
and invited to participate in this Delphi survey. The target experts were from one research 152 
institution at Tongji University (i.e., Research Institute of Complex Engineering and 153 
Management, Tongji University), and five industry institutions (i.e., Jinan Hi-Tech Holding 154 
Group, China Construction Eighth Engineering Division Company, Shanghai Construction 155 
Consultants Association, Shanghai Xian Dai Architectural Design (Group) Co., Ltd., and 156 
Baosteel Group Corporation), which have close collaboration relationships with Tongji 157 
University. All the experts hold senior positions in their organizations and have sufficient work 158 
experience, especially a sound knowledge of collusive practices in Chinese construction 159 
projects. Additionally, their diversified employer backgrounds (i.e., clients, contractors, 160 
consultants, designers, suppliers, and academics) help increase the heterogeneity of the Delphi 161 
panel and thus improve the survey validity. 162 
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Table	3	Profile	of	the	Delphi	panel	163 
Expert Employer Position Years of 
experience 
Largest project ever 
managed/consulted 
A  Client Project Manager 19 US$ 167 million 
B  Client Deputy Manager 16 US$ 308 million 
C  Client Director 15 US$ 231 million 
D  Contractor Deputy Manager 17 US$ 363 million 
E  Contractor Project Manager 25 US$ 122 million 
F  Contractor Project Manager 20 US$ 85 million 
G  Consultant Deputy Manager 16 US$ 35 million 
H  Consultant Deputy Manager 18 US$ 20 million 
I  Consultant General Manager 16 US$ 55 million 
J  Designer Director 25 US$ 197 million 
K  Designer Project Manager 20 US$ 73 million 
L  Supplier General Manager 15 US$ 122 million 
M  Supplier General Manager 17 US$ 167 million 
N  Academia Professor 20 US$ 363 million 
O  Academia Professor 17 US$ 231 million 
In the first-round Delphi survey, experts were requested to assess the occurrence 164 
probability of each initial collusive practice, using a five-point rating scale (i.e. 1 = very few, 165 
2 = few, 3 = medium, 4 = common, and 5 = very common). Additionally, based on their 166 
experience, experts were encouraged to list any new collusive practices that were not included 167 
in the Delphi survey. The mean score of each collusive practice was calculated and then fed 168 
back to the Delphi panel. In the second-round survey, experts were asked to re-assess their 169 
evaluations in the light of the findings obtained in the previous round. A threshold of 3.0 points 170 
was established as a cut-off criterion, as recommended by Jamieson (2004). To verify if 171 
significant difference exists in experts of different backgrounds, Kruskal-Wallis test was 172 
conducted as recommended by Hon et al. (2012) and Ameyaw et al.(2016). 173 
According to the feedbacks from the first-round survey, no additional collusive practices 174 
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were supplemented by the Delphi panel. Table 4 shows the results of the two-round Delphi 175 
survey. The Kruskal-Wallis test result shows that the asymptotic significance value of each 176 
collusive practice is greater than 0.05, indicating no significant difference among the experts 177 
of different employer backgrounds (Ameyaw et al. 2016; Hon et al. 2012). The mean scores of 178 
lack of publicity (CP7) and insufficient tender time (CP8) were below the threshold of 3.0 179 
points and thus were deleted from the list of collusive practices, revealing that the Delphi panel 180 
believes the current publicity and tender time of most tenders in the Chinese context are 181 
adequate. This may be due to the fact that the authority in the Chinese construction sector has 182 
issued mandatory regulations on the level of publicity and tender time for tendering (The 183 
National People's Congress of People's Republic of China 1999) and the majority of industry 184 
practitioners are following these regulations. Figure 1 depicts the network the 20 identified 185 
collusive practices, in which each link represents one specific collusive practice occurring 186 
between the two relevant project stakeholders. The figure reveals that ten collusive practices 187 
occur between the client and other contracting parties and other nine collusive practices occur 188 
between the contractor and other contracting parties. Thus, 19 out of 20 collusive practices 189 
refer to the client and contractor. All these indicate that the client and contractor are the two 190 
primary contracting parties responsible for the collusion in construction projects. 191 
Table	4	Results	of	the	two‐round	Delphi	survey	192 
Code First Round Second Round 
 Mean Asymp. Sig. of KWT Mean Asymp. Sig. of KWT 
CP1  3.94 0.435 3.96 0.467 
CP2  3.73 0.546 3.70 0.613 
CP3  3.44 0.428 3.38 0.586 
CP4  3.33 0.740 3.28 0.703 
CP5  3.28 0.671 3.21 0.609 
CP6  3.15 0.273 3.11 0.348 
CP7 * 2.78 0.543 2.76 0.505 
14 
Code First Round Second Round 
 Mean Asymp. Sig. of KWT Mean Asymp. Sig. of KWT 
CP8 * 2.25 0.431 2.20 0.487 
CP9  3.54 0.434 3.51 0.429 
CP10  3.18 0.435 3.14 0.438 
CP11  3.89 0.578 3.90 0.613 
CP12  3.68 0.286 3.64 0.292 
CP13  3.16 0.532 3.11 0.574 
CP14  3.80 0.531 3.82 0.589 
CP15  3.92 0.336 3.93 0.388 
CP16  3.63 0.333 3.56 0.443 
CP17  3.50 0.581 3.44 0.550 
CP18  3.69 0.504 3.62 0.539 
CP19  3.32 0.356 3.29 0.345 
CP20  3.43 0.443 3.41 0.450 
CP21  3.57 0.436 3.60 0.467 
CP22  3.74 0.517 3.75 0.523 
Note: KWT represents for Kruskal-Wallis test 
    * The collusive practice is deleted due to an evaluation below 3.0 points. 
 
Figure	1	Collusion	network	in	construction	projects 
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Questionnaire Survey 193 
Research of collusive practice was carried out predominantly with the help of a questionnaire 194 
survey (Bowen et al. 2007a; b; Le and Shan 2012; Vee and Skitmore 2003), because a 195 
questionnaire is aneffective and widely used instrument to gauge people’s perceptions on 196 
collusion, a topic that is sensitive and difficult to get objective data (Kenny 2009; Shan et al. 197 
2015). Hence, based on the framework consolidated from the two-round Delphi survey, a 198 
questionnaire survey was administered to evaluate the refined collusive practice in Chinese 199 
construction projects, in terms of probability and severity. 200 
Given that the Chinese construction sector is a large and complex sector with about 201 
29,212,000 employees across the country (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2015), it is 202 
extremely difficult to conduct probability sampling in the questionnaire survey. Therefore, this 203 
study employed purposive sampling, a typical type of nonprobability sampling approach that 204 
can also help obtain a representative sample (Liu et al. 2016; Trochim 2006; Zhao et al. 2015). 205 
To maximize the number of potential survey respondents, some government agencies, research 206 
institutions, and enterprises were contacted. In the end, a total of 12 institutions agreed to 207 
facilitate the questionnaire survey. These institutions are: (1) China State Construction 208 
International Holdings Ltd., (2) China Construction Eighth Engineering Division Company, (3) 209 
Shanghai Construction Consultants Association, (4) Shanghai Xian Dai Architectural Design 210 
(Group) Co., Ltd., (5) China Construction Design International, (6) Research Institute of 211 
Complex Engineering & Management,Tongji University, (7) Zhengzhou Municipal 212 
Construction Commission, (8) Shanghai Pudong New Area Highway Administration, (9) 213 
Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone Development Company Ltd., (10) Zhengzhou Metro 214 
16 
Group Co., Ltd., (11) Jinan Hi-Tech Holding Group, and (12) Baosteel Group Corporation. 215 
These institutions cover diverse stakeholders of Chinese construction sector, including client, 216 
contractor, consultant, designer, supplier, and academia. Apart from that, all these institutions 217 
are active players in their fields, suggesting that they could represent the Chinese construction 218 
sector to a certain extent. In addition, the employees of these support institutions are believed 219 
to possess real and profound understandings of Chinese construction sector and thus are 220 
qualified respondents for the questionnaire survey.  221 
A web-based anonymous questionnaire was developed and distributed to the potential 222 
respondents from the 12 support institutions. Respondents were requested to evaluate the 223 
probability and severity of each collusive practice using a five-point rating scale (i.e., “1” 224 
represents the least probability and severity, “5” represents the highest likelihood and severity). 225 
Such measuring approach is recommended by Shen et al.(2001), Molenaar (2005), Zou and 226 
Zhang (2009), and Ke et al. (2011) in their risk evaluation studies which are similar to the 227 
assessment of collusive practices in this study.  228 
Results 229 
A total of 108 responses were collected from the questionnaire survey. After a careful visual 230 
examination, 11 were found to be inappropriately filled out and thus excluded. Therefore, a 231 
total of 97 valid responses were used for the further data analysis. Table 5shows the profile of 232 
the respondents. The respondents were from diversified employers (i.e., government, client, 233 
contractor, consultant, designer, and academia). More than 70% of them had at least six years 234 
of practical experience in this sector. More than 80% of them were holding middle or senior 235 
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managerial positions in their organizations. Such a panel of respondents is believed to be able 236 
to provide reliable evaluations on the collusive practices.  237 
Table	5	Profile	of	respondents	238 
Personal 
attribute 
Category Number of 
respondents 
Percentage Cumulative 
percentage 
Employer Client 19 20 29 
 Contractor 25 26 55 
 Consultant 18 19 74 
 Designer 15 15 89 
 Supplier 11 11 100 
 Academia 9 9 9 
Position Top managerial level (e.g., president, 
general manager, chief director, 
professor) 
22 23 23 
 Middle managerial level (e.g., project 
manager, department director, 
associate professor) 
48 49 72 
 Professional (e.g., engineer, 
technician, quantity surveyor) 
27 28 100 
Years of 
experience 
>20 19 20 20 
11-20 28 29 49 
 6-10 37 38 87 
 <5 13 13 100 
As the probability and severity of each collusive practice were evaluated simultaneously, 239 
the following Formula 1 was developed as suggested by Ke et al. (2011) and Hwang et al. 240 
(2015a), to calculate the significance index of each collusive practice provided by each 241 
respondent. Table 6 shows evaluation results of the refined framework of collusive practices. 242 
nsinpini CPCPCP                                              (Formula 1) 243 
Where niCP   = the significance index of the ith collusive practice provided by the nth 244 
respondent 245 
npiCP  = the probability assessment of the ith collusive practice by the nth respondent 246 
nsiCP  = the severity assessment of the ith collusive practice by the nth respondent247 
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Table	6	Rankings	of	collusive	practices	248 
Code Significance index Respondents of different stakeholder 
Client (CL) Contractor (CT) Designer (DE) Consultant (CS) Supplier (SU) Academia (AC) 
 Score Rank Normalization# Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
CP11  4.03 1 1 4.25 2 3.86 4 3.87 6 4.06 1 3.96 1 4.19 1 
CP15  3.97 2 0.89 4.23 3 3.82 5 3.94 4 3.83 9 3.93 2 4.08 4 
CP1 3.94 3 0.83 3.45 12 4.25 1 4.11 1 3.92 4 3.94 3 3.96 10 
CP4  3.93 4 0.81 3.32 18 4.13 2 4.03 2 4.01 2 3.95 2 4.15 2 
CP18  3.91 5 0.78 3.95 6 3.72 11 3.94 4 3.87 7 3.89 5 4.09 3 
CP12  3.90 6 0.76 4.35 1 3.54 15 3.98 3 3.78 13 3.67 12 4.08 4 
CP19  3.88 7 0.72 3.74 9 4.08 3 3.85 8 3.96 3 3.65 13 3.98 9 
CP16  3.84 8 0.65 4.08 4 3.61 14 3.86 7 3.65 17 3.85 6 3.99 8 
CP3  3.77 9 0.52 3.34 17 3.73 10 3.85 8 3.83 9 3.85 6 4.03 7 
CP20  3.75 10 0.48 3.82 8 3.75 9 3.54 17 3.92 4 3.52 18 3.93 14 
CP17  3.74 11 0.46 3.87 7 3.43 20 3.51 18 3.82 11 3.85 6 3.96 10 
CP21  3.74 12 0.46 4.06 5 3.52 17 3.82 10 3.85 8 3.23 20 3.95 13 
CP22  3.72 13 0.43 3.43 14 3.79 6 3.79 11 3.91 6 3.37 19 4.05 6 
CP5  3.71 14 0.41 3.45 12 3.78 7 3.69 13 3.73 14 3.78 9 3.85 15 
CP6  3.71 15 0.41 3.24 19 3.77 5 3.71 12 3.82 11 3.78 9 3.96 10 
CP10  3.67 16 0.33 3.70 10 3.47 18 3.66 14 3.69 15 3.72 11 3.79 18 
CP9  3.63 17 0.26 3.37 15 3.69 12 3.64 15 3.67 16 3.61 14 3.82 17 
CP2  3.59 18 0.19 3.23 20 3.66 13 3.63 16 3.61 19 3.58 15 3.84 16 
CP13  3.54 19 0.09 3.36 16 3.45 19 3.50 19 3.65 17 3.54 16 3.72 19 
CP14  3.49 20 0 3.65 11 3.53 16 3.32 20 3.27 20 3.53 17 3.66 20 
Note: # normalized value = (average actual value – average minimum value) / (average maximum value – average minimum value)249 
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After the significance indices of all collusive practices were calculated, statistical tests 250 
were conducted with the aid of Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 17.0. To test 251 
its reliability, the common tool Cronbach’s alpha was adopted (Deng et al. 2014). In this study, 252 
the Cronbach’s alpha was 0.935, higher than the threshold of 0.7. Therefore, the evaluations 253 
provided by the respondents can be considered as reliable.  254 
To test whether each collusive practice has significant impact on Chinese construction 255 
project, the one-sample t-test was conducted as suggested by Hwang et al. (2015b) and Zhao 256 
et al. (2013a, 2013b). The hypothesized value of 3.00 and the significance level of 0.05 were 257 
adopted. As shown in Table 7, the p-values of all the collusive practices were less than 0.05, 258 
suggesting that all the collusive practices have significant impacts on Chinese construction 259 
projects.260 
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Table	7	Statistical	test	results	of	collected	data	261 
Code CL-
CT 
CL-
DE 
CL-
CS 
CL-
SU 
CL-
AC 
CT-
DE 
CT-
CS 
CT-
SU 
CT-
AC 
DE-
CS 
DE-
SU 
DE-
AC 
CS-
SU 
CS-AC SU-
AC 
p-
Value 
 Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. 
CP1 0.539 0.499 0.896 0.660 0.899 0.875 0.101 0.348 0.162 0.060 0.284 0.108 0.666 0.595 0.525 0.000# 
CP2 0.583 0.355 0.589 0.647 0.771 0.363 0.671 0.692 0.129 0.138 0.255 0.119 0.910 0.121 0.228 0.000# 
CP3 0.148 0.060 0.078 0.098 0.196 0.122 0.780 0.316 0.573 0.344 0.904 0.081 0.122 0.602 0.179 0.000# 
CP4 0.299 0.285 0.567 0.385 0.598 0.702 0.064 0.303 0.082 0.072 0.367 0.085 0.632 0.659 0.354 0.000# 
CP5 0.359 0.272 0.218 0.290 0.192 0.768 0.555 0.439 0.986 0.680 0.215 0.809 0.144 0.536 0.449 0.000# 
CP6 0.121 0.074 0.103 0.091 0.100 0.724 0.405 0.408 0.572 0.156 0.192 0.690 0.808 0.179 0.208 0.000# 
CP9 0.109 0.145 0.101 0.136 0.060 0.654 0.377 0.874 0.224 0.639 0.847 0.385 0.522 0.532 0.186 0.000# 
CP10 0.059 0.064 0.061 0.079 0.143 0.192 0.644 0.341 0.773 0.464 0.986 0.223 0.623 0.563 0.349 0.000# 
CP11 0.665 0.165 0.267 0.060 0.383 0.202 0.056 0.126 0.175 0.124 0.474 0.214 0.141 0.884 0.085 0.000# 
CP12 0.623 0.467 0.521 0.482 0.672 0.357 0.642 0.507 0.749 0.647 0.965 0.323 0.769 0.489 0.389 0.000# 
CP13 0.502 0.408 0.720 0.561 0.640 0.645 0.378 0.892 0.499 0.153 0.628 0.292 0.574 0.953 0.636 0.000# 
CP14 0.080 0.262 0.092 0.231 0.244 0.859 0.873 0.674 0.852 0.754 0.638 0.779 0.760 0.942 0.871 0.000# 
CP15 0.080 0.055 0.244 0.061 0.131 0.140 0.233 0.269 0.372 0.373 0.621 0.406 0.877 0.880 0.782 0.000# 
CP16 0.968 0.933 0.771 0.743 0.713 0.898 0.441 0.422 0.556 0.351 0.365 0.639 0.789 0.223 0.275 0.000# 
CP17 0.100 0.055 0.144 0.089 0.156 0.498 0.213 0.780 0.363 0.129 0.845 0.111 0.178 0.945 0.284 0.000# 
CP18 0.178 0.213 0.297 0.346 0.254 0.748 0.785 0.872 0.507 0.555 0.707 0.400 0.962 0.716 0.724 0.000# 
CP19 0.704 0.473 0.773 0.465 0.845 0.294 0.833 0.573 0.282 0.201 0.797 0.071 0.463 0.361 0.149 0.000# 
CP20 0.754 0.699 0.804 0.718 0.703 0.904 0.736 0.716 0.799 0.604 0.729 0.839 0.515 0.569 0.915 0.000# 
CP21 0.570 0.390 0.565 0.516 0.654 0.414 0.551 0.585 0.832 0.125 0.986 0.393 0.263 0.803 0.546 0.000# 
CP22 0.548 0.320 0.229 0.323 0.089 0.108 0.245 0.129 0.139 0.483 0.780 0.643 0.377 0.181 0.902 0.000# 
Note: #The collusive practice exists in significantly and has significant impact on Chinese construction projects at the significance level of 0.05.262 
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To test if significant difference exists among respondents of different employer 263 
backgrounds, the independent samples t-test was conducted, as suggested by Zhao et al. 264 
(2013c), Ning and Ling (2013), and Hwang et al. (2014a). A confidence level of 95% was 265 
adopted in this study. The test results in Table 7 show that significance values of all collusive 266 
practices are greater than 0.05, indicating no significant differences among the respondents of 267 
different employer backgrounds. 268 
Discussions of the Primary Collusive Practices 269 
To identify the primary collusive practices in construction projects, normalization was engaged 270 
to the questionnaire survey results, as instructed by Xu et al. (2010). Table 6 shows the 271 
normalization results. A cut-off threshold of 0.5 was adopted according to Xu et al. (2010). 272 
Correspondingly, the top nine collusive practices were selected as the primary collusive 273 
practices and discussed in details.  274 
Misrepresentation of qualification certificates was ranked first with an evaluation of 4.03 275 
points by the respondents. This collusive practice refers to the misuse of technical qualification 276 
certificates by the tenderers. In the Chinese construction sector, a corresponding qualification 277 
certificate is a mandatory precondition for a tenderer to participate in tendering. Nevertheless, 278 
in some cases, companies having qualified certificates may reach collusive pacts with 279 
unqualified companies and let its certificates out to the latter (Tai and Qiu 2011). Hence, by 280 
using the rented certificates, the unqualified companies can participate in tendering and are 281 
given the opportunity to win projects that they are incapable of implementing, which would 282 
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bring numerous risks to the projects. 283 
Loose site supervision ranked second among all collusive practices. In the Chinese 284 
construction sector, a site supervisor supervises the execution of a construction project on 285 
behalf of the client (Rojas 2013). Thus, many contractors would bribe site supervisors in order 286 
to reap a higher profit. Meanwhile, the income of site supervisors in the Chinese construction 287 
sector is low compared with other project professionals such as contractors, consultants, 288 
designers, and suppliers (Lin and Chen 2004). Therefore, unsurprisingly some site supervisors 289 
may fail in maintaining their integrity standard and collude with contractors. 290 
Misusing prequalification requirements ranked third with an evaluation of 3.94 points. As 291 
an important and necessary tool for contractor selection, prequalification has been widely 292 
adopted in Chinese construction projects (Russell and Skibniewski 1988; Xia and Ye 2005). 293 
But it can also be utilized illegally by the conspirators. For instance, current Chinese tendering 294 
regulations allow a client to shortlist potential tenderers via prequalification if there are 295 
numerous potential tenderers. Whereas some clients misuse this privilege by setting specific 296 
requirements to exclude qualified tenderers and only allow its favored tenderers to participate 297 
in tendering (Xia and Ye 2005), which runs counter to the rule of free competition. Table 5 298 
shows that respondents from the contractor and designer subgroups both gave a top ranking to 299 
this collusive practice. 300 
Fake tendering received the fourth ranking with an evaluation of 3.93 points. This is a 301 
typical collusive practice in the Chinese construction sector, committed by the client and its 302 
preferred tenderers (Le et al. 2012a; Wang and Qin 2011). In conducting this collusive practice, 303 
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a client usually pre-selects a contractor/consultant/supplier in advance based on its preference 304 
and then calls other tenderers to undertake the organizational or statutory tendering procedures. 305 
Obviously, such collusive practice is difficult to be detected because all the tendering 306 
procedures have been followed rigorously based on the protocols.  307 
Approval of the unnecessary change orders was ranked fifth in this survey with an 308 
evaluation of 3.91 points. Changes in construction projects arise due to the active or passive 309 
modification of the original scope, execution time, or project design, and its occurrence is 310 
inevitable due to the complexity, uncertainty, and uniqueness of each project (Hanna et al. 2002; 311 
Hwang et al. 2014b). Meanwhile, the change of orders is also a major source of cost overruns 312 
(Jiang et al. 2001). Therefore, to maximize their profit, though illegally, many contractors are 313 
inclined to propose as many unnecessary change orders as they can, and try to get these change 314 
orders approved even by bribing the client staffs. Undoubtedly, this typical collusive practice, 315 
which exists widely in the Chinese construction sector, leads the project to be over-budgeted 316 
(Le et al. 2012b; Zhou et al. 2007).  317 
The collusive practice of collective collusive tendering by helping one another severely 318 
damages the competitive nature of tendering, and was ranked sixth in this survey with an 319 
evaluation of 3.90 points. Under the excessive competition pressure in the Chinese construction 320 
market, some contractors may enter into a collusive agreement where a “designed winner” is 321 
designated in turns and others should help the “designed winner” win the project (Wu et al. 322 
2009). More specifically, the “designed winner” submits an artificially high tender price, 323 
whereas others submit even higher ones to help the “designed winner” win the project. 324 
Additionally, after the “designed winner” signs the contract, it may provide some compensation 325 
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to the “unsuccessful” tenderers or employ the “unsuccessful” tenderers as subcontractors 326 
(Zhang and Zhao 2008; Zou 2007). The similar collusive practice has also been identified and 327 
discussed in the Australian and South African construction sectors (Bowen et al. 2007a; b; Vee 328 
and Skitmore 2003). 329 
The nomination of a particular supplier was ranked seventh with an evaluation of 3.88 330 
points. In the Chinese construction sector, the client usually has the privilege to nominate one 331 
supplier for material or equipment supply and recommends it to the general contractor. Hence, 332 
a supplier may bribe the client staff for such a collusive nomination. However, to compensate 333 
the cost for the bribery, the supplier may provide cheap and unqualified materials & equipment, 334 
which inevitably lead to the potential quality hazard (He et al. 2009). 335 
Issuing the certified works falsely was ranked eighth with an evaluation of 3.84 points. 336 
Considered as most susceptible to bribery (Ameh and Odusami 2010), quantity surveyors play 337 
a vital role in this collusive practice together with contractors. After reaching a collusive 338 
agreement, the quantity surveyor would issue completion certificates to the contractor even 339 
when jobs are incomplete or sometimes abandoned. Other specific cases of this collusive 340 
practice include over-measurement of quantities of various items of works, covering 341 
unexecuted items of work in the periodic evaluation, over-blowing cost of design variation, 342 
and inflation in prices of the works (Zou 2006).  343 
Inflating tender price received ninth ranking with an assessment of 3.77 points. In doing 344 
this collusive practice, some staffs of the client usually imply its preferred tenderer to inflate 345 
the tender price first and then seek kickback in return after the contract is awarded. This 346 
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collusive practice is more common in Chinese public projects (Le et al. 2012a). This can be 347 
explained by the principal-agent theory that the agent (i.e. the collusive staff of the client) has 348 
different idea and purpose from the principal (i.e. the client) inevitably, which may finally lead 349 
to a moral hazard that the agent reaps his/her private benefits in cost of the principal’s (Turner 350 
and Müller 2003). 351 
Conclusions 352 
Through a systematic literature review, a two-round Delphi survey, and an empirical 353 
questionnaire survey, this study identified and ranked the collusive practices in Chinese 354 
construction projects. The survey results indicated that the primary collusive practices in 355 
current Chinese construction projects are, misrepresentation of qualification certificates, loose 356 
site supervision, misusing prequalification requirements, fake tendering, approval of the 357 
unnecessary change orders, collective collusive tendering by helping one another, the 358 
nomination of a particular supplier, and issuing certified works falsely. 359 
Although the identification and prioritization of the collusive practices in the Chinese 360 
construction projects have been provided, this study suffered several limitations. First, the 361 
prioritization of the collusive practices is subjective as it was obtained from the opinion-based 362 
data, and thus influenced by the individual experience of those surveyed. Second, this study 363 
employed a nonprobability sampling approach that is less accurate and rigorous than 364 
probability sampling (Trochim 2006). Moreover, due to the sensitive nature of the topic, this 365 
study only received a small number of feedbacks in its questionnaire survey. Therefore, 366 
cautions should be warranted when the results are interpreted and generalized. Lastly, the 367 
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findings from this study were interpreted in the context of China, which may vary in the context 368 
of other countries.  369 
In spite of these limitations, implications of this study is still useful, especially for those 370 
international contractors that are being or going to be involved in the Chinese construction 371 
sector. This study provides helpful insight about collusive practices in the country. Further 372 
research actions could be directed to the following two directions. First, underlying factors 373 
contributing to the collusive practices should be investigated, which may reveal the rationality 374 
of collusion in construction. Second, corresponding anti-collusion strategies, as well as its 375 
effectiveness, should be examined, which may provide the industry with a full-scale 376 
understanding of collusion and thus facilitate in curbing it more efficiently. 377 
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